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3 January 1958

JUSTIFICATION FOR ADDING KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
(INCLUDING PETROPAVLOVSK) TO HIGHEST PRIORITY LIST

1. The KAMCHATKA Peninsula may be used by the Soviets as an ICBM launch site or base for submarines with guided missile capability for attack against North America.
2. Concern that this possibility may be materializing stems from the following:
 - a. The strategic location of the peninsula, vis-a-vis the North American continent, in terms of proximity and free access to the sea.
 - b. The high sensitivity with which the Russians view the KAMCHATKA area, evidence of this lying in their reactions to ferret flights and past AQUATONE penetrations.
 - c. The possibilities of guided missile equipped submarines at PETROPAVLOVSK, it being known that at least two with such capability for conversion have been constructed at KOMSOMOLSK and possibly have been converted at PETROPAVLOVSK. Furthermore, there is evidence indicating a considerable strengthening of the KAMCHATKA flotilla by the addition of long range submarines. There is reasonable possibility that at least one of these may be nuclear powered.
 - d. Increase of shipping and air activity. In the course of the last two years, there has been a vast increase in shipping destined for PETROPAVLOVSK and other ports in KAMCHATKA, many of which were fishing ports not normally suited to the receipt of extensive cargo. Thus far, no explanation has been deduced for the movement of such large quantities of shipping although indications


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are that substantial quantities have been consigned to a special military construction activity with a record of association with guided missiles activity.



4. Attention is called to the fact that in submitting this addition to the highest priority list the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee has not altered its views as of 9 October 1957 (TCS-2152-57) with regard to the pre-eminent importance among highest targets of those which bear upon the long range bomber problem (the Navy dissent remaining as stated in that case). It is also noted that except for UKRAINA and KOMSOMOLSK there is no competition among the AQUATONE assets for covering this target in the event operations in the Far East are permitted.

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